Evaluating Information Sharing

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Evaluating Information Sharing

Definition of Information Concept and Intelligence Concept 

The intelligence community is challenged by the most problematical human history in the world resulting from globalization of incredible complexities. They are instances where they are heavily contingent on foreign partners, where discrepancies like domestic and foreign do not mean anything, where all difficult matters portray complex relationships, and where in analytic discipline the sensitivity source severely limits that ability to disseminate information broadly. The 20year ongoing struggle with information overload is difficult due to the challenge in dealing with domestic and foreign information. Bad actors desire to take action that will have strategic consequences, leading to low barrier entry making the characters use globalization against the intelligence unit. Virtually, all important subjects are the complicated mosaic of political, economic, technical, military and social components. 

Since 9/11, information sharing problem has been decreed by the commission to be about systematic or human resistance. The information concept poses challenges that call for an approach that stitches communities together and creates intelligence enterprise. In theory, intelligence uses their technological know-how to connect organizations by use of social networking tools to build a flat structure as it strives to achieve ‘wisdom of crowd.’ Around 80% of all appropriate information was unclassified which is higher than today, and majority of analytical areas. 

Differences in the concepts 

The differences in these two terms do not vary because the intelligence concept is dealing with the information sharing. The existence of intelligence sector is because of information use and sharing with federal and other certified sectors. These two concepts work hand in hand to ensure that the secrets and critical information stick to the minds and hands of only the appropriate few. 

How Difficult Is the Sharing Of the Two Concepts

In the realm of information sharing, the intelligence sector has shown progress. However, there remain some emotive issues that are making the situation worse for the intelligence sector due to the use of wrong approaches that are fruitless. One challenge that the intelligence sector is doing is laying more emphasize on information sharing rather than stating their roles and responsibilities on the issue by addressing who does what before lecturing on who gets what. Another failure that the intelligence sector has failed is trying to level the enterprise before insuring that the community performs discovery filling the capabilities gaps through addressing them. They should also focus on their non-federal partners’ unclassified support by accepting the increased access to classified information as part of their solution. However, there is a major factor always to consider which is –‘bad actors will always leave footprints.’

Sharing Of Information among Sectors

Not all intelligence information is shared among the sectors. The government or federal sector may deny access to some useful information to non-federal and private sectors. This is because; the extent to which information is availed to the community greatly varies with the subjective matter. Not all of US person’s information should be disseminated to all sectors because some of it is crucial and may leak to individuals or bad actors like terrorists. 

Significant Information-Sharing Problems and Challenges

Establishing a Mission Based Framework for Information Sharing

Based on information sharing framework, a mission may be established by three major initiatives. The first initiative is the general delineation of responsibilities and roles that explain what analysis is and who performs it. Since 9/11, information sharing has been mistakenly used to avoid hard mission discussions and the importance of the mission. The community especially the government, shows to be unable or unwilling to clearly define mission space by misguidedly lumping different disciplines together on ‘‘all sources analysis’’ rubric. Title 10, Title 50 and non-Title 50 organizations are examples that claim to assert ‘‘all source analysis’’ and they thus require all the underlying information. Such a claim is a disadvantage to the intelligence sector because not all information is supposed to be disseminated. 

The big challenge is the insufficient political methods that address different legislative prerogatives that are at work, and the only alternative to curb this is laying out general principles that are associated with the individual or the group that particular analysis aspect, which will monitor on the person to receive the specific information. The delineation of responsibilities and the accessibility of the information are represented in a pyramid with the requirements from top to bottom and access from greatest to least. The capabilities of various social networking are enormous the existing solution could be an open free flow of information for Top Secret Originator Controlled (ORCON) amongst intelligence community analysts that ensure open debate and as well as allowing different communities to stay abreast on the others thoughts. 

Discovery

The second key initiative is founded on the first, establishing True capability discovery. This is the principle of joining without the priori knowledge of the existence between them. All bad actors categories like; terrorists, foreign weapons developers, arms traffickers, proliferators and others leave electronics footprints while they communicate, move money, travel or identifying themselves. This data that is associated with activities exist in the wide range of repositories, some law enforcements, some from other private sector organizations; some intelligence communities, some open source, some from other Governmental organizations and some transactional. Some of the data contain a lot of US personal associated data and are to be treated with differently.

There is technical a wherewithal to process the data, but lacks no existing policy or legal framework to guide the process. This is a challenge to the intelligence sector, because even after having the technology, the legal system is restricting these processes. The restrictions by legal and policy framework are an indication of a gap in the sector. Another challenge is the belief by some people that because the last terrorist attack was 9/11, there should be no more precautions. 

It will result in multiple agencies and departments cutting deals to get each other with ‘‘bulk data stores’’ which is a sub-optimal, expensive and inefficient proposition. The government has failed to centralize its activities which will act as a solution to the issues. The important aspect according to this article is distinguishing the type of work from pattern analysis. The goal should not be in identifying activities that mirrors nefarious activities indicators, but the large scale data integration and correlation should focus on creating connections that assist law enforcement and intelligence communities which under DNI direction will require analytical tools and massive computing power. 

Support to State and Locals

  The third initiative is improving non-federal access promptly with appropriate information. Traditionally, the non-federal colleagues had no clearances, but tear lines which would work regarding techniques, procedures and tactics associated with terrorism and the approach was thus inadequate. For example, the intelligence sector has shared much of its information, but the federal government has failed in by causing the local and state partners in carrying expensive and unnecessary actions. Another issue is that even if the information is correct, by definition, the unclassified tear line is a crude instrument which gives very little context and details leaving the recipients within guesswork on the seriousness of a threat and allocation of scarce resources. 

However, the government has improved on utilizing standardized context statements over transform without proper vetting. They have increased the availability of classified information JTTFS and at Fusion centers, but the aspect has a big “last tactical mile” problem which is the inability to have classified electrons. The national policy should thus dictate an adoption of appropriate security/ technical solution which will allow non-federal partners who are cleared to log in on classified machines and review the finished intelligence production.

Reference

Travers, R. (2014). Information Sharing, Dot Connecting and Intelligence Failures: Revisiting Conventional Wisdom. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report Of The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States;, 416-426. Retrieved from http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_national_security/2009_galileo_award.authcheckdam.pdf