The outsourcing of military services by governments is as old as war itself. Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs)/Private Military Firms (PMFs)/Private Security Contractors (PSCs) all refer to civilian arms enlisted by governments in combat zones to offer services that are wide ranging from logistics, base support, translation and combat. Largely a metamorphosis of groups that used to be called mercenaries, these private contractors are fully corporate bodies with better organization and training. However, their deployment remains controversial following scandals, unprofessional behavior, corruption, opacity and unaccountability in their actions. More importantly, it has appeared virtually impossible to regulate private security contractors despite the need for the same appearing obvious. The completed study aimed at coming up with a framework for regulating private security contractors, with respect to their heavy deployment in the Iraq War. Noteworthy, private contractors formed at least half of US troops in Iraq, a number which was both unprecedented and largely unplanned for.
The study was theoretical, with a qualitative research design. Scholarly articles and books were retrieved from popular academic databases, Google Scholar and Proquest, with a critical analysis of the same accorded as treatment. The aim of the method was to identify major themes and variables that constitute the practice of private security contracting and its regulation. The theoretical framework of the study encompassed two major theories: the state’s monopoly to legitimate use of force and the agency theory. Both theories offered a perfect frame for the analysis of private security contracting and the challenges inherent of it.
Several themes emerged in the analysis. Among the prolific ones included the failure to have a strategic plan in the hiring of contractors and instead working on an ad hoc basis. This led to poor contract management and unaccountability on the part of the PMSCs. There was also a recalcitrant problem in the lack of transparency with no government agency aware of exact numbers of contractors, nature of their work, ownership and structure of PMSCs and so forth These loose ends helped contractors to remain impervious to prosecution and scrutiny by the Senate and other stakeholder bodies despite laws existing to govern the same. A puzzle also persists on the interest of PMSCs to end wars when they profit from them.
Consequent to the above findings, a framework of regulation was proposed; encompassing first a holistic strategy on the deployment of PMSCs. It should be clear who, what, where and when a PMSC was engaged by the DoD and their activities open to scrutiny. Next, there would be licensing and registration of PMSCs to ensure that their numbers, mandate and contractual limits are well known. The DoD had to also come up with clear guidelines and regulations for keeping private security contractors accountable. This would increase the chances of identifying violations and demanding accountability on the same. Also important was enactment of buttressing legislation to seal any legal and regulatory loopholes hence create a solid accountability framework.
The use of Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSC) in war, stabilization efforts and humanitarian contexts is not new. The practice is as old as war itself, only that there have been a few elements of metamorphosis leading to new ways of deployment and internal structure. According to Petersohn (2013), private security contracting represents the modern version of what used to be termed as mercenaries, who played a crucial role in many wars dating as early as the Middle Ages. Unlike mercenaries of the past, private security firms are fully corporate bodies offering a wide range of security services ranging from technical assistance, warfare merchandize, strategic planning, tactical combat operations to logistical support. This modern shape of private security firms emerged in the 90s following the end of the cold war and the general wave of neo-liberalism wherein governments began to outsource for key functions. The end of the US-Soviet duel signified substantial downsizing of official armies, but later widespread instability across the globe necessitated sustained military presence of superpowers like the US in various areas overseas (Petersohn 2013). Though public opinion has generally been against private security contracting, it is unlikely that the US will abandon the practice any soon. Every day, there emerges need for military services in magnitudes that the US cannot satisfy on their own. Meeting such demand leaves the government with no choice but to engage the services of private military contractors.
There are many other reasons why private military contracting continues to thrive even amidst growing controversy. As has already been stated, the US cannot possibly meet their military needs using their own armies. They have expansive interests across the globe that makes it financially and administratively imprudent to secure using their own armies. Schwartz (2010) adds that there is a political dimension to deployment of troops, with the government finding it difficult to sustain large armies and deploy everywhere their interests are. It is notable that America’s military spending is already a subject of debate and controversy, and further inflation would not survive the court of public opinion. It would make more sense to have more money spent on healthcare, education and other core services rather than wars. In such circumstances, the government has to maintain their war interests with the help of private security contractors (deployed on a need basis) and hence avoid the political costs of war. Elsewhere, governments like the US’ are known to engage in military activities that may seem at conflict with their own laws and International law. In such events, the government needs possible deniability, which is best achieved through deploying private armies. Other situations that have sustained the role of private armies is the emergence of security gaps following the withdrawal of troops in places like Afghanistan (Schwartz 2010). While official military duties may be over in such places, there remains a need for order and preserving the interests of different stakeholders. In such war torn areas, essential stakeholder agencies such as the UN may still need to continue operations and such cannot proceed without security. Private security contractors often therefore come in to fill such a vacuum.
The regulation of private security contractors has been at the center of controversy for decades. All stakeholders agree that there is need for regulation but the who and how of it has never been addressed. There have been debates on self-regulation or government imposed guidelines but none of them have been articulated in coherence. The need for regulation is however well demonstrated. First, McFate (2017) reckons that private security contractors are faced by a perennial conflict of interest- making profits from war. How could they be trusted to aid in stabilization, end conflicts and avert war if such would keep them out of business? Private security contracting derives its demand from wars, and as such, without conflict their services would not be needed. This worries various stakeholders, more so the general public as to whether such firms really play abatement roles in war. It is logical to think that private security contractors have no genuine interest in ending wars unless they have another “business” destination. They need to sell weapons, engage in combat or planning of wars to make their profits. There is thus need for a regulator to keep an eye on their practices and ascertain that they try to end conflicts rather than fuel them. In another dimension, private security firms have been accused of unlawful activities in the past. Internally, they have treated enlisted combatants inhumanely as they chase profits. Once a soldier is injured, there is no proper welfare or compensation with the firm replacing them immediately (McFate 2017). Further, unlike formal armies, there is lack of discipline and professionalism in their troops, leading to human rights abuses.
Perhaps the greatest desire for regulation of private security contractors stems from the obfuscated lines of engagement with host nations, based on the thesis fronted by Isenberg (2009). They operate under flexible frameworks and goodwill, creating tension in the process. Generally, such firms operate under the air of unaccountability, impunity and opacity. The host nations or even their own clients lack full knowledge of their operations, organization and there is absolutely no genuine scrutiny. This sometimes degenerates into friction between them and law enforcement, with the secretive nature of their operations blocking what would have otherwise been constructive synergies. In 2007, there was a shootout between Iraqi Police and a private security firm, Blackwater. 17 civilians were killed in the process and following the incident, the private security firm was stripped of their immunity (Isenberg 2009). Finding it extremely hard to move on from the ordeal, the company had to rebrand as Xe besides suffering innumerable losses. This brought to light the challenges of non-regulation of private security contractors, with engagement with host countries and their own clients turning chaotic. As such, the need for regulation in private security contracting cannot be overstated.
The Iraqi War (2003- 2011) encompassed a heavy deployment of private military and security contractors. McFate (2017) noted that such companies were engaged in various military duties from the outset, with the US and their allies bringing them onboard to complement conventional military resources. The withdrawal of US troops from the country in 2011 expanded the opportunities for private military and security contractors, with a newly emerged threat of the Islamic State (IS) and other insurgent groups that opposed US occupation and the post-invasion Iraq government. It has been reported that more private military agents have perished in the war than US soldiers under the Presidency of Obama.
However, the deployment of private security contractors was not come without its fair share of challenges as posited by Kruck (2014). First, it remains unclear as to what roles they played/continue to play in the conflict. It is speculated that they offered logistical support and engaged in combat situations as well as re-training of Iraqi forces. None of these roles can be stated with certainty as their operations proceed in secrecy and the US military itself remains uninterested in shedding any light on the same. They enter into confidentiality agreements and draft vague contracts which make it difficult to follow up or report on contractual violations. The financial and administrative data on the same is also scarce and incomplete. For instance, the US Central Command failed to offer any data on private military contractors in the year 2007, leaving it to imagination as to how, where and when they were involved. Apart from runaway opacity and unaccountability, there were various scandals involving private security firms such as the aforementioned case of Blackwater. Notably, the latter created animosity between private security contractors and Iraqi police, with law enforcement agencies cracking down on private security firms. With their immunity withdrawn, they were harassed by immigration officials and police, with the Iraqi government keen to assert their authority. Some scandals such as the Abu Ghraib torture incident contributed to negative press and global outcry over the violation of human rights by private security contractors. In the end, the need for regulation in private security contracting had never been more apparent. This paper thus explores a framework for private security contracting in Iraq to help safeguard the firms from both internal and external constraints.
The general objective of the study was to come up with a regulatory framework for private security contracting. More specifically, the aim of the study was to craft an appropriate and practical framework of regulation for private security contractors in Iraq.
The research questions for the study were:
Though private security contracting is an old practice, there has never been a genuine, consistent and practical regulatory framework. This has led to operations of private security contractors in impunity, unaccountability and opacity. In addition, private security contractors, in comparison to conventional armies, have demonstrated lack of discipline and disrespect to human rights in their operations. Besides these critical issues, the enduring paradox of private security contractors being enlisted to end wars they profit from remains unaddressed. Understandably, the above issues have led to constant negative attitude and media coverage on private security contractors, notwithstanding the critical role they play in global stability and peace. This calls for a regulatory framework that can ensure internal discipline and alignment to human values in the practice of private security contracting. In the end, there may be a shift in both public and media perception on private security and military contractors.
The current study shall be of immense value to policy makers and top military stakeholders in their outsourcing of military and security services. As has been stated earlier, it is inevitable that the US government will continue to procure the services of private security firms, in spite of the negative press and public opinion. This study shall offer a useful framework which upon implementation will not only bring sanity to the outsourcing of military services but also inspire public and stakeholder confidence in the practice. More importantly, the government shall be able to keep such firms accountable and true to their contracts. For private security firms, the present study shall be important in defining their relations to their clients and host nations. This shall prevent rivalry, sabotage and victimization which may result from their operations being undocumented and unregulated. The general public and other civilian stakeholders on their part shall benefit from the confidence that private security contractors work towards peace and stability rather than sabotage the same for the sake of profits. Also important is the fact that the study contributes to the growing literature on private security and military contracting. The challenges, endurance and future of the practice have earned it a subject on its own right. Students and scholars in that line of research will definitely find the paper useful.
There are several limitations to the current study. First, it relies on secondary data found in published scholarly articles and books rather than primary evidence. In that case, any bias or mistakes in prior research may be inherited in the study save for mitigation through methodological rigor. Elsewhere, the study focuses on a subject that is difficult to research on due to the deliberate opacity and secrecy in private security contracting. This implies that some information may be inaccessible or inadequate to generalize or form new theories. The study shall hopefully break new ground and avail a firm foundation upon which future studies shall be built. Elsewhere, due to limited time and resources, the sample size was limited, with less thirty articles involved in the literature review. Time and resource constraints also narrowed the study down to private security contracting in Iraq, despite the knowledge that the US has extended military outsourcing to other areas like Syria and Afghanistan.
This paper is based on two essential theories: The State’s monopoly of violence and the agency theory.
Social theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau have demonstrated the crux of the state’s monopoly in the legitimate use of violence in what has been famously been known as the social contract theory. The latter assumes that citizens and governments exist in an informal contract with exclusive responsibilities (Jessop 1990). The citizens in the social contract give up their right to violence in return for state protection. As such, the social contract theory births the current theory of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force. The only legitimate use of violence that remains within the civilian population is in the case of self – defense. This understanding would be impossible without the Weberian definition of the state – Max Weber argued that the only way the state can fulfill its central task is by maintaining an exclusive use of physical force (Jessop 1990). This theory is highly relevant in the case of private military and security contractors as their deployment challenges the responsibility and even authority of the state. The involvement of non-state actors such as private security contractors means that the state no longer has the monopoly of legitimate use of violence. These contractors are involved in combat and in the past have been hired by different parties to single handedly unleash violence on chosen targets. The implications of such outsourcing are chaos on the social contract theory.
Looking at Weber’s definition of the state, private security contractors may be looked at as challenging to the authority of the state. If the state’s qualification is maintaining a monopoly in the use of legitimate force, then outsourcing of security functions effectively weakens it. The theory of the state’s monopoly on use of legitimate force therefore provides a useful frame in understanding the regulatory issues that arise from the deployment of private security firms, more so with respect to accountability and transparency to the state. Noteworthy, Singer (2008) points out that outsourcing of security functions and on a larger frame, the breakdown of the state’s monopoly of power, challenges its foundation. The author points out those non state actors of violence have a tendency of becoming powers by themselves and yielding more authority than local institutions. This happens mostly in areas of poor governance and anarchy, which is the case in many war torn regions. Iraq and Afghanistan can be loose examples of areas without effective governance and capable of conferring more power to non state agents of violence than legitimate state institutions. It is from such a setting that we find a backlash between state actors and private security contractors. The theory of state’s monopoly of violence therefore offers the most expansive platform of contextualizing the role of private security contractors, regulation and state relations.
The agency theory has been extensively acclaimed across different disciplines to explain the problems that arise in agency relationships. An agency relationship arises when and individual or a group of persons (known as the principals) hire one or more persons (known as the agents) to perform specified duties on their behalf (Eisenhardt 1989). The agents in this case are delegated with decision making authority and full powers to represent the principals. In most cases, these relationships are often not harmonious, given the self interest problem of agents. It has been observed that in many cases agents may pursue self-interest which would be in conflict with the interests of the principals. In the case of private security contracting, this theory points to the problem of enlisting private contractors to end wars that they profit from. The interests of private security agents are to make profits, which is mutually exclusive to that of the principals who hire them (they normally look forward to peace and stability). In the end, there will be conflicts arising from the notion that private security contractors are fueling war rather than working to end it. This theory also sets the grounds of regulation by demonstrating the complexity of the principal-agent relationship of private security firms and their clients. Other problems in agency relationships include the agent performing duties other than those they have been commissioned to; or the agents gaining information that empowers them against the principals (Eisenhardt 1989). These are genuine issues that deserve consideration in crafting a regulatory framework for private security contractors.
This section incorporates peer reviewed articles and books on the practice of private security contracting, private security contracting in Iraq and their regulation. Its objective is to compile information necessary for developing a regulatory framework for private security contractors within the stated spatial limits.
There has been a longstanding interest by scholars, politicians and policymakers to understand Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs). According to Carmola (2010), the understanding of these entities has gained controversy due to two essential problems. First, PMSCs defy straightforward categorization and we cannot put a clear face on them. It is unclear what they do and who they really are. A good example of this conundrum has been presented by the author with respect to the deployment of private security contractors in Iraq. Five years into the war, a senate committee could not tell with certainty the number of contractors, who they employed and what they were doing alongside the military. Different agencies attempted to give numbers which were not only contradictory, but added into the mystery on the who and what of private security contracting. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office in 2008 could only give estimates of the amount of money paid to private security contracting. The figure was placed between $15 billion and $ 20 billion, in what was termed as the best attempt yet to explain the controversy of private security contracting. Carmola (2010) also added that a qualitative description of PMSCs was impossible. The companies were arbitrarily dissolved, their ownership was unclear and the names of the enlisted soldiers remained confidential. The latter could only be identified with numbers which was insufficient for making any genuine follow up regarding any issue. An army Colonel in the Iraqi war explained how difficult it was to understand or identify private security contractors, noting that some did not even have military training or experience. They would be found handling weapons improperly, displaying a bad attitude, with no uniforms or name tags and driving SUVs. Their identity was summed as highly protean- like the amoeba. They change in shape and structure, come and leave without notice.
Carmola (2010) also makes an important point with respect to the sophistry in identifying private security contractors. The author explains the adoption of the umbrella term “Private Military and Security Contractors” (PMSCs) due to the difficulty in separating private military firms from those that identify as “security firms” according to function. Both categories lack clear job descriptions or structures and personally lack a narrative to explain what they do. They could be one and the same thing, but again they could be different- it’s impossible to tell. Their striking similarities include the lack of clear lines of authority- there is no explicit statement on who is in charge, the main contractor and the sub contractor and hence who bears accountability in different scenarios. Initially, such companies were known as private military firms (PMFs) owing to their enlisting of former soldiers. However, they resisted this moniker, instead preferring the name Private Security Companies (PSCs). The resistance to the term “military” was a deliberate attempt to downplay their offensive military abilities given the possible political implications of the same. Carmola(2010) presents the phrase “PMSCs” as an umbrella term reached on as a compromise to refer to such private security companies. Therefore, the first problem with private security contractors is the lack of a clear definition, identity and/or boundaries. As has been demonstrated, it has been problematic to even allocate them a suitable name.
The second problem facing PMSCs is the negative public and stakeholder perception. Carmola (2010) states that no matter what they do, these firms are deemed to be corrupt, undisciplined and vehicles of impunity. The author expounds that this challenge is rooted on their history. Private security companies are a throwback of what used to be known as mercenaries and pirates, unleashing violence on behalf of governments and corporations. These companies espouse the same challenges that were inherent of mercenaries – lack of discipline and reliability. Singer (2008) quotes Frederick the Great terming private security contractors as lacking in loyalty, discipline, team spirit or courage. Their workforce endangered missions with their cowboy attitude of bravado, besides being expensive and unreliable. With such a negative reputation, any attempt to legitimize them has been met with resistance on the suspicion that they are corrupt and generally inappropriate for deployment. The negative perceptions have been worsened by their own actions such as delivering substandard work, dishonoring contracts and continued operation in opacity. However, it has been demonstrated widely that the misconduct of private security companies is largely exaggerated, and in essence no equivalence can be made to mercenaries of the past. Despite this, these companies agonizingly continue to be referred to as mercenaries in many different settings. A notable example is given by Leander (2005) highlighting such references by the United Nations Human Rights Commission working group on PMSCs. The working group referred to private security contractors as mercenaries and went ahead to resist calls to replace the terminology. This was the height of negative perception of private security contractors by stakeholder groups given the international stature of the UN agency. These notions continue to shape formal and informal discourses around private security contracting across the globe.
Though the use of private security contractors has been ubiquitous within US history, Iraq and Afghanistan provide the best examples of such deployment in the modern age. Much of the literature on PMSCs indeed revolves around Iraq, given the length of the war and its unending implications. Petersohn (2013) explains that there have been two factions debating the effectiveness of private security contractors in Iraq. One group, termed as statists, argue that PMSCs are ineffective and corrupt, while opposing neoliberals deem them as a useful and necessary compliment to regular troops in battle. The author adds that both notions have been hinged on anecdotal evidence, which is not only unreliable but misleading. Petersohn (2013) presents perhaps the most concrete defense of PMSCs with respect to their effectiveness. Using data from Wikileaks’ “Iraq war logs”, he compares the performance of private security contractors to Iraq and US troops. The article concluded that PMSCs were not only better than poorly trained troops like those of Iraq, but also a significant number of able US troops. The article blows open the debate on the role of PMSCs and their perceived ineffectiveness. However, it must be noted that the data used in the study can be questionable given the controversial standing of Wikileaks and the potential scarcity of corroborative evidence. The study however makes a general point on the usefulness of PMSCs in war zones and the possible augmenting purpose to regular troops.
Schwartz (2010) presents a useful background and analysis to the deployment of US troops in Iraq. The author foregrounds the topic by highlighting the historical uses of mercenaries in wars by the US, giving examples such as the Revolutionary and Continental wars both in which private contractors were hired to provide logistics, food and weapons to US troops. After the end of the cold war, the department of defense (DoD) embarked on a de-escalation campaign, in which they cut logistic resources and personnel. This ended the country’s self-reliance in participating in various wars globally, requiring them to collaborate with contractors for their missions. It is now argued that the DoD is incapable of completing major military tasks without the input of private contractors, citing examples of the Iraq, Afghan and Balkan wars, where contractors formed half of the US workforce. The author justifies the reliance on contractors in wars such as Iraq on various grounds. To begin with, contractors are easy to hire and are ready to deploy unlike regular forces that require capacity building. Elsewhere, such contractors are important in offering complimentary non combat duties to regular troops. This allows the military to deploy their personnel fully in combat and avoid wasting them on non-combat duties. It is also noteworthy that contractors help the DoD to save money. This is because they are hired on a need basis and reassigned from tasks as soon as the work is over. This is more economically sound than maintaining a regular army in bloated numbers especially in times of peace and stability. These factors explain why it was necessary to deploy private security contractors in Iraq and their allure to the US DoD.
Schwartz (2010) further attempts to characterize the numbers and functions of private security contractors in Iraq. Using data from the Central Command Region, the author posits that there were around 95,400 contractors in Iraq by the year 2010, compared to 95,000 troops which accounts for just over 50% of the total personnel pursuing US interests in Iraq. This corroborates earlier evidence and speculation that there were more contractors than regular troops in Iraq, providing a wide range of services. The same data shows that about 65% of the contractors were involved in base command support encompassing services such as maintaining the grounds, providing food and carrying out laundry. The other major function was security, with around 12% of the contractors directly involved in the provision of security services. The author estimates that at least 80% of the personnel were involved in these core functions. However, these revelations are contradicted by Isenberg (2009) who reckons that for the first three years of the Iraq war, there were barely any statistics on the number of private security firms, military spending on the same, the fate of wounded combatants and the US’ spending on outsourced military services. Even after attempts by the then legislator and Presidential Candidate Barack Obama to table amendments to bring greater transparency, information remained scarce. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that no US agency had complete data on private contractors in Iraq, with a large number of figures released to the public merely estimates. Isenberg (2009) notes that the opacity is deliberate, with the government advising private contractors to refer media contacts to the DoD rather than divulge any information on their operations. The private security contractors have also withheld information about their operations on account of self-interest as well as confidentiality agreements with their clients. In the end, it has become almost impossible to get credible and meaningful information on PMSCs in Iraq.
Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura (2008) add that despite the US employing contractors in Afghanistan and Bosnia, Iraq was the heaviest deployment in their history. The article focuses on a majority of pre-mentioned gains and the necessity of private contractors. There seems to be general consensus in literature that there can be no successful US military action in Iraq and other parts of the globe today without the enlisting of private contractors. Their role is critical for both support and combat duties. Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura (2008) however note that their involvement comes at a risk of undermining stability efforts in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Notably, their lack of discipline and human rights abuses in selected cases undermine the efforts to win public trust by the US military, without which counterinsurgency efforts cannot succeed. It is therefore important that their activities are closely monitored to ensure they do not sabotage the overriding objectives of their enlisting.
One of the most problematic areas in private security contracting has been their regulation by the DoD. In their own admission, the military had not carefully thought out their deployment and particular involvement in combat situations and training. This is reported by Schwartz (2010), who adds that the reliance on private security contractors in Iraq was not only unprecedented but unplanned. Some of the issues that arose from poor regulation include wasteful spending on contractors, scandals such as those of Blackwater and the Abu Ghraib Prison and general unaccountability. Decrying the careless manner in which contractors had been deployed; Senator Barack Obama argued that it was impossible to win the battle of minds and hearts whilst heavily relying on unaccountable contractors. Numerous GAO and Gansler commission reports highlighted the need for more regulation and provoked a response from military stakeholders regarding the matter. One of the results of the reports was the setting up of the Joint Contracting Command (JCC) to centralize and formalize the procurement of contractors. Schwartz (2010) notes that the reports also provoked the DoD to send more personnel to assist in the handling of more complex contracts.
Elsea (2010) highlights the legal framework for private security contractors. The author notes that private security contractors are first subject to international laws, including relevant treaties, resolutions of the UN Security Council and the international order of laws and uses of wars. The deployment of private contractors is however a grey area in international law, with the focus limited to the treatment of Prisoners of War (POW). Apart from international law, private security contractors are subject to US laws as well as the laws of the host countries. In the Iraqi war, this means that contractors were regulated by both US law and Iraq laws.
The US congress has also focused their efforts on private security contracting though most of it has been reactive rather than proactive. Schwartz (2010) notes that the House Committee on Armed Forces, Homeland security and that on Government Affairs have held hearings on the matter and raised concerns over the misconduct of private security contractors. These hearings were evident following events of shooting of civilians, use of excessive force as well as disregard to the customs of the locals in both Iraq and Afghanistan. There has also been a few legislations towards the same including the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which required the secretary of state to work closely with the secretary for defense in coming up with guidelines and regulations for the screening, authorization and accountability of PMSCs. Among the guidelines and regulations expected were reporting on used weapons, injuries and death. Elsewhere, the US has sufficient laws under which private security contractors can be prosecuted and held accountable. According to Ryngaert (2008), litigation is the best way of socializing them and can be useful in motivating them to come up with their own accountability mechanisms as well as increase transparency in their activities. The author notes that while holding them to account under tort law may be difficult, there are numerous jurisprudential opportunities under criminal law. Criminal punishment can send a strong signal but the gap remains in the case of prosecutors. They need to provide more leadership in bringing cases to court.
Chesterman and Lehnardt (2007) explain the problematic nature of regulating PMSCs. To begin with, the issue is normally shunned with the focus on how they have been deployed and the results of the same. Stakeholders are yet to form a meaningful path towards regulation with most measures created on an ad hoc basis. Elsewhere, it is difficult to decide on a regulatory framework due to the scarcity of data on the number, type and function of private security contractors. Regulation would need an understanding of the specific activities such contractors engage in and as such it is fundamental to have them disclosed prior to enacting regulation. There is also a general disinterest in both the military and the contractors to make a full disclosure of private security contracting, making their activities impervious to Congress, prosecutors and other stakeholders who attempt to hold them to account. There is need to overcome these issues and craft a credible mechanism of regulating private security contractors.
The study assumed a qualitative research methodology. This aims at identifying new themes, concepts and ideas about a given subject. In such methodology, there is no manipulation of variables but instead attempts to understand phenomena in their natural setting (Cresswell et al 2007). A qualitative research design was appropriate in this case because coming up with a regulatory framework does not entail working with specific variables but rather examining the entire subject to identify the relevant ones. The method has also been largely acclaimed in social phenomena and thus was the best for treating the subject of private security contracting. It should also be appreciated that private security contracting suffers from the problem of inadequate and/or unreliable data, implying that a quantitative research design would have not resulted in credible findings.
The research was theoretical. This involved the search of credible academic databases such as Google Scholar and Proquest and retrieving scholarly articles and books on private security contracting in Iraq. The information from the literature served as the data for the study, generating the necessary variables for the development of a regulatory framework. The inclusion criteria encompassed any peer reviewed material that had been published within a ten year period. The exclusion criteria on the other hand included unpublished and non-scholarly materials or materials that were archaic (outside the ten year period of publishing, save for theories). The sample was quite substantial featuring over 15 sources, a majority of which were books with lengthy discussions on the subject matter.
Ethics
The study was embarked on with approval from the ethics committee. Further, all other ethical considerations including use of appropriate language, academic conventions and reference to persons involved in the research in any way was done in line with established ethical codes in research writing.
It was evident from literature that private security contracting and the US military are inalienable. There was heavy reliance on private contractors with available statistics indicating that their numbers slightly superseded those of regular troops in Iraq. Weighing the different arguments for and against, it is a self-evident fact that nothing was bound to change in the foreseeable future. The US military was likely to rely even more on contractors than they have in the past. The reasons for this are quite many. They range from the de-escalation of military resources after the cold war, the convenience and economic advantages of hiring contractors and the rise of insurgency in areas like Iraq following withdrawal of US troops (Schwartz 2010). More importantly, contractors offered complimentary non-combat services which helped the US to deploy more soldiers in the battlefield. These positives and imperatives indicate the inevitability of hiring contractors in the present and future of US military.
The challenges of deploying PMSCs were also quite a number. First, it was clear that the US lacked an overriding, well thought out strategy of enlisting contractors. They deployed on an ad hoc basis, and in the end, the numbers of contractors were both unprecedented and unplanned for. There was no reliable data on how many contractors were deployed, what they were doing, and how much was being spent on the same (McFate 2017). The clandestine nature of their operations birthed scandals like the Blackwater and Abu Ghraib. The US simply failed on strategy and a methodology of keeping contractors accountable. The PMSCs on their part were undisciplined, in some cases unprofessional and poorly trained. Their actions were largely at variance with established military codes and the objectives of US missions abroad. Killing of civilians, disregard to local customs, lack of official dress codes and official lines of command made them a hindrance to the US’ goal of winning civilians in Iraq. The end result was a negative attitude towards contractors amongst civilians and the media regardless of whether they performed essential functions or not.
On regulation, it was apparent that the conversation was quite alien to military and the PMSCs. They seemed reluctant to embrace any meaningful regulation and were instead content with a few reactionary measures such as Senate hearings following a scandal (Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura 2008). In addition, it was difficult to come up with a regulatory framework when the number of contractors, the nature of their work, their budget and areas of operation were unclear. PMSCs operated in a high air of impunity, opacity and unaccountability that made them immune to adverse legislation or litigation.
From the above network of factors, we can deduce the underlying challenge in private security contracting as the lack of transparency in the numbers, work, mandate, misdemeanors and budget figures in their work. Such opacity has made it difficult to regulate them for both the US government and the international community. Another challenge is the non-strategic manner in which their services are procured, which leads to poor contract management and/or lack of regulatory capacity for the US military. Baseline solutions are twofold: First, the DoD must come up with an encompassing strategy that details how, where and who they are going to enlist as contractors. There should be a clear strategy covering every aspect of private security contracting from contract management, budgets, and formalities to accountability (Elsea, Schwartz and Nakamura 2008). From this strategy, the DoD should engage in a rigorous process of licensing and registering private contractors. Given the sensitive nature of civilian arms, the US must only engage licensed and registered contractors, whose actions, organization structure and ownership is transparent. Congress, courts of law and other stakeholders must be at liberty to access any records held by such contractors upon request, and their actions should be open to scrutiny. Once there is such transparency and accountability, the US Congress must follow up on the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to ensure that they have clear regulations and guidelines on enlisting of private security contractors, which allow for effective implementation of accountability mechanisms (Schwartz 2010). It should be possible to litigate issues involving contractors using the new regulations and guidelines. If necessary, new laws should be enacted to buttress the prosecution of contractors back in the US soil if found culpable of any violations. There should be no legal and regulatory loopholes whatsoever that irrigate unaccountability.
Fig 3.1: Framework for regulating PMSCs
The study unearthed critical issues regarding the deployment of PMSCs including inherent challenges. However, it was clear that private security contracting was not only important as part of the US military strategy, but also unavoidable both in the present and future military operations. The negative press and public opinion notwithstanding, the role of contractors was not to be ignored. This provokes the need for a proper regulatory mechanism to cure the ills bedeviling the enlisting of civilian arms at the moment to help bring accountability, transparency and institutionalization of private security contractors. We therefore recommend the following:
Carmola, K., 2010. Private Security Contractors and New Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics. Routledge.
Chesterman, S. and Lehnardt, C. eds., 2007. From mercenaries to market: The rise and regulation of private military companies. Oxford University Press.
Creswell, J.W., Hanson, W.E., Clark Plano, V.L. and Morales, A., 2007. Qualitative research designs: Selection and implementation. The counseling psychologist, 35(2), pp.236-264.
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of management review, 14(1), pp.57-74.
Elsea, J.K., 2010. Private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal issues. Diane Publishing.
Elsea, J.K., Schwartz, M. and Nakamura, K.H., 2008, August. Private security contractors in Iraq: Background, legal status, and other issues. Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service.
Isenberg, D., 2009. Shadow force: Private security contractors in Iraq. ABC-CLIO.
Jessop, B., 1990. State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place. Penn State Press.
Kruck, A., 2014. Theorising the use of private military and security companies: a synthetic perspective. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(1), pp.112-141.
Leander, A., 2005. The market for force and public security: The destabilizing consequences of private military companies. Journal of Peace Research, 42(5), pp.605-622.
McFate, S. 2017. The modern mercenary: Private armies and what they mean for world order. Oxford University Press.
Petersohn, U., 2013. The effectiveness of contracted coalitions: Private security contractors in Iraq. Armed Forces & Society, 39(3), pp.467-488.
Ryngaert, C., 2008. Litigating abuses committed by private military companies. European Journal of International Law, 19(5), pp.1035-1053.
Schwartz, M., 2010. Department of Defense contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and analysis. Diane Publishing.
Singer, P., 2008. Corporate Warriors – the rise of the privatized military industry. Itahaca: Cornell University Press
Delivering a high-quality product at a reasonable price is not enough anymore.
That’s why we have developed 5 beneficial guarantees that will make your experience with our service enjoyable, easy, and safe.
You have to be 100% sure of the quality of your product to give a money-back guarantee. This describes us perfectly. Make sure that this guarantee is totally transparent.
Read moreEach paper is composed from scratch, according to your instructions. It is then checked by our plagiarism-detection software. There is no gap where plagiarism could squeeze in.
Read moreThanks to our free revisions, there is no way for you to be unsatisfied. We will work on your paper until you are completely happy with the result.
Read moreYour email is safe, as we store it according to international data protection rules. Your bank details are secure, as we use only reliable payment systems.
Read moreBy sending us your money, you buy the service we provide. Check out our terms and conditions if you prefer business talks to be laid out in official language.
Read more