The Problem of Perception

Perception is a very crucial mind process, because it helps in converting sensual codes into some substantial knowledge. According to Fumerton and Jeske, the sense perception, entailing the apprehension or awareness of things by hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch, has been a preoccupation of philosophers since time immemorial (44). One pervasive and classical problem, at times known as “the problem of perception,” is the outcome of perceptual hallucination and illusion. Perception refers to the automatic combination of sensory motivation. Some sections equate it with thinking where a person’s ideas do not present a significant impact to the process. Consequently, it does not rely on volition in any way. This paper explores a single fundamental problem of perception, by arguing that perceptions useful in reconciling obvious truths concerning real world experiences with the probability of certain perceptual errors. Consequently, it is the foundation of all knowledge.

From a conception filled with intuition, perceptual experience describes the level of a person’s openness to the sensual world. In contrast, this apparent state of openness is undermined by the existence of some possible or actual phenomena, which are usually known as illusions or hallucinations. In this light, the theoretical frameworks of perception are required to offer an in depth response to such a threat through offering an account of the sense of perception. This is because of its role in preserving what philosophers view as the central feature of relating to the natural world (Raftopoulos & Machamer 168)

The problem under analysis is not tantamount to the epistemological problem, which explores how perception opens one up to knowledge of the exterior world. Even in cases where an individual thought that the epistemological problem was solvable through the adoption of a reliability framework of perceptual warrant, the problem of perception (as described by this analysis) still holds. This is because such a problem features as antimony or a form of paradox, which stands independent of the epistemological issue. The problem reveals a simplified structure, which provides that perception intuitively appears to be a clear openness to the real world. As a result, perception seems impossible according to the generalized understanding of the majority of societies, civilizations, and generations. The following sections are committed to exploring the illusion and hallucination arguments.

The argument from Illusion

In reference to this discussion, Leicester and Taylor define perception as a random perceptual circumstance in which a real or physical object is perceived in actual sense, but in which the said object virtually appears as opposed to its real nature (23). For instance, a black wall in a red illumination appears red; if one drinks a sweeter drink, there are chances that the drink that he or she drank before could have a sour taste; if a person stands next to a source of sound, it will seem louder than usual, and so on. From the aforementioned examples, it is not necessary that an individual is deceived into holding that phenomena are other than they ought to be. In this sense, illusion does not comprise deception, and an individual can comprehend another person’s illusion when it takes place. While the majority of things are identified through the argument of illusion, the underlying idea usually includes some steps such as when a person is subject to an illusion state, there are chances that the object has some qualities F and G, one that the ordinary thing that is being perceived does not really reflect such qualities.

            Illusion is a form of perception that leads to some basic knowledge. It is because things that people are perceptually aware of are not the usual objects of the natural world which they actually assume to be aware of.  This explains why the majority of philosophers moved from this argument to a further conclusion, which states that since people are aware of something in perceptual experience, what they really are aware of is another kind of object, which is known as a “non-ordinary” object (Fumerton & Jeske 200).

The Argument of Hallucination

According to this analysis, a hallucination is defined as an experience that appears to be exactly like a perception of a mind-independent and real object, but where a mind-independent object of the perception does not exist. Hallucinations, just like illusions, do not necessarily comprise deception and do not need to appear like the real hallucinations that drug-users, mentally ill people, or even alcoholics experience . They are relatively supposed to be possibly mere events and experiences that cannot be distinguished from the subject according to the genuine analysis (perception) of the object. For example, suppose a person has a visual encounter of a churchyard covered in snow. According to the popular assumptions that hallucinations are evident, there could be an experience that is indistinguishable with respect to the subject, from the interior-from the point of views of a veridical perception of the churchyard covered in snow, but where, in real sense, there is no churchyard being seen at the moment.

Leicester and Taylor categorically argue that the illusion argument, the underlying idea behind the hallucination argument, features in various ways (200). Firstly, it is possible for an individual to have a hallucination experience, which cannot be distinguished subjectively from a genuine perception, but where there does not exist an object perceived from a mind-independent point of view. The hallucinations that cannot be distinguished by subject form feature as experiences of the same kind. As such, it is not possible that the significance of the perception relies on the experienced objects (Fumerton & Jeske 213). This is because the same type of experiences can take place when the objects are absent.

Conclusion

In conclusion, perception features as the foundation of all knowledge. This is because human beings acquire unprocessed information about the universe through their perceptive sense. It is also the foundation of the philosophical theories and concepts. According to this analysis, both illusions and hallucinations interfere with the process of knowledge because they undermine the perceptive tendencies of people, making them to hold a different view from other people (Fumerton & Jeske 213). In this case, people are bound to arrive at different conclusions about the same phenomena.

Works Cited

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Fumerton, Richard A, and Diane Jeske. Introducing Philosophy Through Film: Key Texts, Discussion, and Film Selections. Chichester, U.K: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Print.

Leicester, Mal, and Denise Taylor. Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum: Developing Critical Thinking Skills, Literacy and Philosophy in the Primary Classroom. Maidenhead, Berkshire: McGraw-Hill/Open University Press, 2010. Print.

Raftopoulos, Athanassios, and Peter K. Machamer. Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Print.