COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY

The cold war foreign policy, the containment was basically a United States policy using numerous strategies towards preventing spread of communism internationally during the Cold War. This paper discusses the factors that prompted the change of the foreign policy and the effects of change of the policy.

This component of Cold War, policy was as a response to the series of moves done by Soviet Union to increase the communist influence within the Eastern Europe, Korea, China and Vietnam. The policy represented the middle-ground positions between the rollback and the détente[1]. The containment was first described by the Defense Secretary George Kennan in his Long Telegram. He described the Soviet power being scattered and dangerous, hence claimed that it ought to be contained. The foundation of this doctrine was articulated in the 1946 cable of the U.S. diplomat George Kennan. The term was a translation of French cordon sanitaire, which was used to describe the Western policy towards the Soviet Union during the 1920s[2].
            The National Security Councils Reports 68 abbreviated as NSC-68 was a fifty eight-page and top secret policy paper that was issued by the U.S National Security Councils in 1950, April 14, during the reign of Harry S. Truman as president of the United States. It was among the significant statements of the American policy during Cold War time. The NSC-68 largely shaped U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War for 20 years, and it involved the decision of making containment of the Communist expansion of high priority. Strategies outlined in the NSC-68 achieved its ultimate victory with the collapse of Soviet power and emergence of the “new world order” that was centered on the American liberal-capitalist values[3].

The Containment was associated strongly with President Harry Truman policies, including the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization abbreviated as NATO that was some mutual defense pact. Further, President Johnson cited the containment as the justification for his policies applied in Vietnam, while President Richard Nixon, working with Henry Kissinger, his top adviser rejected the containment in favor of the friendly relations with China and the Soviet Union. This relaxation of tensions or détente, involved the expanded trade as well as cultural contacts. The central programs under the containment, including the NATO and the nuclear deterrence, remained in the effect after the end of this war[4].

Following the communist revolution of Russia in 1917, there were calls by the Western leaders of isolating the Bolshevik government that seemed intent on promoting the worldwide revolution. The Key State Departments personnel became increasingly frustrated with the suspicion of the Soviets as war drew to close. The U.S. ambassador of Moscow, Harriman, a “confirmed optimist” regarding the U.S.-Soviet relations, became disillusioned by what he concluded as Soviet betrayal of 1944 Warsaw Uprising and by violations of February 1945 Yalta Agreement about Poland. Harriman would have later had significant influence on forming Truman’s views about the Soviet Union. In 1946 February, the U.S. Department requested George F. Kennan, at U.S. Embassy of Moscow, about why the Russians had opposed the idea of creating the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Kennan responded with a wide analysis of the Russian policy, the Long Telegram. According to him; The Soviets had perceived themselves being in a state of war about capitalism; The Soviets decided to use controllable Marxists within the capitalist world; the Soviet aggression was not related to the views of Russian people or with the economic reality, but with the historic Russian paranoia; Soviet government structure prevented the objective and accurate pictures of the internal and external reality[5].

In 1947, March, President Truman, Democrat, requested the Republican controlled Congress allocate $400 million in the aid of the Greek and the Turkish governments, who were then fighting against Communist subversion. President Truman pledged supporting the free people who resisted the attempted subjugation by the armed minorities and by the outside pressures. This pledge later became the Truman Doctrine which portrayed this issue as a huge clash between the totalitarian regimes and the free peoples. This speech marked the beginning of cold war and the adoption of the containment as an official U.S. policy[6].

President Truman realized his speech by implementing a series of measures that would contain Soviet influence within Europe, the Marshall Plan that was the European Recovery Program, and the NATO, which formed a military alliance among the Western European nations that were created in 1949 and the U.S. since the containment required some detailed information about the Communist moves, the U.S government relied heavily upon Central Intelligence Agency abbreviated as CIA[7].

The overall military mobilization reflects the American national as well as military history. As the nation grew, physically and economically, its standing within the international community was also established. Given its size of armed forces today; technological levels; equipment requirements; and diversity of threat and missions, it is evident that military mobilization was necessary in maintaining the cold war policies[8].

After the cold war the policies that were administered by the major participants had long term implications on the society. The U.S since then has been a capitalist state. Its economy significantly developed due to the idea. The rich however turned out to oppress the poor. In the communist states, the societies’ economy has lagged behind in development[9].

References

Brands, Hal. 2010. Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Fink, Carole. 2014. Cold War: an international history. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, a member of the Perseus Books Group.

Klein, Christina. 2003. Cold War orientalism: Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945-1961.

            Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sheehan, Sean. 2003. The Cold War. North Mankato, Minn: Smart Apple Media.

Westad, Odd Arne. 2007. The global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of our times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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[1] Brands, Hal. 2010. Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

[2] Sheehan, Sean. 2003. The Cold War. North Mankato, Minn: Smart Apple Media.

[3] Klein, Christina. 2003. Cold War orientalism: Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945-1961.

Berkeley: University of California Press.

[4] Brands, Hal. 2010. Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

[5] Klein, Christina. 2003. Cold War orientalism: Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945-1961.

Berkeley: University of California Press.

[6] Sheehan, Sean. 2003. The Cold War. North Mankato, Minn: Smart Apple Media.

[7] Fink, Carole. 2014. Cold War: an international history. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, a member of the Perseus Books Group.

[8] Westad, Odd Arne. 2007. The global Cold War: third world interventions and the making of our times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[9] Sheehan, Sean. 2003. The Cold War. North Mankato, Minn: Smart Apple Media.