A vague concept

A vague concept is one that is lacking in clarity, is intrinsically uncertain or imprecise. A vague idea will leave some allowance for borderline ideas. The concept has a certain ambiguity that fails to differentiate it from other similar concepts rendering it unclear. In this context, the author distinguishes between vague and precise concepts on the basis of their precision.  Some concepts are metaphysically accurate and, as a result, its application is governed by the features of the object on which it is applied. Contrast this with what the author refers to as precise pragmatic concepts. A pragmatically precise concept does not imply a lack of reason as much as it implies that our reasons are not as a result of features of the thing on which we apply the concept. Since the application of pragmatically precise concepts is indeterminate, it can only be made determinate artificially.

A slippery slope argument is one which asserts the inevitability of an event following another without any rational argument to demonstrate the inevitability of the argument. Such arguments advocate the acceptance of a succession of events without direct evidence. A prime example of this would be arriving late for a class and being told, “Today you were late for ten minutes, tomorrow it will be an hour, and someday in future you may not show up altogether”. This argument is a slippery slope since we cannot substantiate that today’s events will have any bearing on tomorrow’s or indeed future events.

In the article, an example of a slippery slope argument on lying would be extending lying to children as a justifiable basis for lying to adults. Sidgwick argues for paternalistic lies. He claims the reason we lie to children is because it is for their own good, and they will be better off for it. He goes on to justify lying to adults by saying if we lie to children, then we might as well lie to everyone as we are applying the same general principle. Sidwick’s views are misguided since morality can only operate on the basis of determinate and precise concepts and not the indeterminate ones.

Sidgwick’s argument that paternalistic arguments are always right as long as they are intended to maximize aggregate happiness is a prima facie argument for utilitarianism. However,  this is misguided as it relies on the assumption that we can have determinate knowledge about what consequences are good and what are bad. Sidgwick defines pleasure as “feeling which the sentient individual at the time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable” (Sidgwick). He, however, fails to account for the fact that some of the feelings he describes may at times place an individual in a situation where they are unable to know they would feel about something at a later stage.

Sidgwick gives a slippery slope argument about lying that is consistently common in defenses of utilitarianism. He points out that we may lie to children about the information we feel they should not be privy to, and to protect them. Also, we may lie to an invalid about their actual state if knowing might lead them to depression. Lies, in this case, are for their sake. Sidgwick then asks why we should not lie to other persons when it is for their sake (Sidgwick,131). The utilitarian view is this is not only excusable, but also right. To counter his argument, one might point out that moral principles should operate on determinate principles and not on arbitrary, indeterminate ones. If we can be paternalistic to adults on the basis that we already do the same to children, what is to stop one from applying the same logic to any other moral dilemma, like say abortion? We cannot justify the euthanizing of a physically challenged or severely disfigured infant on the basis that we would do the same to a severely disabled and disfigured fetus.

Kant’s Formula of Humanity prescribes that we treat humanity as an end in itself, not purely as a means to be used to an end. Human beings, like any rational creature, consider themselves as an end unto themselves. Since they regard themselves thus, it follows that they should not be used merely as a means to any other end. Instead, it is necessary that they are treated. Here, by ‘humanity’ Kant refers to the ability to propose an end to oneself, while ‘means’ refers to something whose value lies in its use. It is worth noting that Kant does not entirely rule out the use of humanity as a means to an end, what he decries is its mere use for the said purpose.

The implication of the Human formulation is that lying is always wrong.  According to Kant, “rational nature exists as an end unto itself” (Kant and Meiklejohn, 123) and we are entitled to choose freely an end for ourselves. We view the results of our free rational choice as good. It follows from Kant’s formula of the universal law of nature that we should regard the results of the free rational choices of others as right as well. Deceit denies one the ability to make a rational choice on any matter and is, therefore, wrong.

Autonomy has been thought to be a matter of degree. Children, for example, are considered to acquire it gradually until such a point as they have the ability to self-govern. The utilitarian view would argue for lying being right on the grounds of insufficient autonomy. Consequently, another slippery slope argument emerges from this presumption. Since human beings have imperfect rationality, it is argued that we should all be treated as if we lack the capacity for self-government. Kant argues against this. His view is that each person should be treated like a free rational being, in spite of our imperfect rationality (Kant, Ellington and Wick, 443).

Sidgwick would advise that we lie to adults just as we would lie to children, idiots or the invalid. Evidently, this is not right. If the lies end up being used by the party that has been deceived to make a decision, and such a decision was based even in part on the lie, such a lie is intuitively impermissible. Kant, on the other hand, maintains the opposite view. According to him, all lies are intuitively impermissible. In my opinion however, some lies are permissible. If for example telling the lie would potentially save a human life, then the lie is intuitively permissible.

Works Cited

Kant, Immanuel, and J. M. D Meiklejohn. The Critique Of Pure Reason. Raleigh, N.C.: Alex Catalogue. Print.

Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods Of Ethics. [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Print.

Kant, Immanuel, James W Ellington, and Warner Arms Wick. The Metaphysical Principles Of Virtue. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964. Print.