Introduction
There have been changes and upgrades that have influenced the phenomena of cybercrime, as such causing small disparities in policies and procedures executed by the current government and other previous governments. Although Congress and the Senate have worked towards creating a reliable cyber-crime law, there are still challenges evident. There have been concerns that China has hacked American gas system and Russia have a back-door to United States grid systems, as well the legal concerns that Russia helped rig the United States elections. Pagliery (2019) illustrates the possible weaknesses in cybercrime resources, more so on the policy. Given laws such as Federal Information Security Modernization Act (2014) or Homeland Security Presidential Directive alongside several policies, programs, and standards, one notes there are missed opportunities, as well as general and legal challenges all influencing the trajectory of cybercrime discussion.
Opportunities
The nation is gifted with law-enforcement individuals who are well trained in dealing with international standards of computer systems and complex forensic software investigation. Appreciating human capital is imperative since it evaluates the overall ability of forensic software considerations. However, these men and women aligned to the CIA, NSA, or FBI need to be empowered for surveillance missions, monitoring data misuses, evaluating possible attacks, and investigating unethical or criminal behavior. In this same floor, the USA Patriot Act (2001) allowed massive surveillance of citizens. Parallel laws such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 allow communication to be surveyed affirmatively. It is also believed that China has been implanting its intelligence mercenaries, as students and later government or corporate officials. It is important to redefine the surveillance, and in fact, start preparing the Ethical Surveillance and Patriotism Act 2021, a law that would help reinforce the need to weed out foreign mercenaries that took advantage of our benevolent immigration systems.
Besides, it is important to amend the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement (CALEA) that requires all U.S. telecommunications to modify their equipment and allow wiretapping for telephone and broadband. Americans need not fear anything if they abide by the law and remain patriotic. Sadly, most devices are currently manufactured in China; as such, China has created massive surveillance on the United States, illegally collecting data for their use. The United States trade wars prove China will continue surveillance as long as it can manufacture devices. Without regard, the Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement (Act) needs to come up with recommendations allowing telecommunications companies to monitor individuals traffic phones, being in a position to monitor illegal data extraction by China while buffering a more ethical approach for surveillance. The amendment should also defeat counter-surveillance limitations.
5G
Alongside surveillance, one considers that daily communications that depend on VoIP are currently outcompeted by China’s introduction of 5G network. China has threatened that it will aid in the issuance of the 5G licenses aimed at boosting domestic usage for next-generation mobile technology. China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) presents a key threat since it plans to install the 5G network on 4K televisions, which would ultimately cripple U.S. cable TV, as most of the Chinese TV comes with either Simcard support or WiFi. This house needs to consider the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), and possibly reprimand China for mounting higher surveillance mechanisms that would make it more vulnerable for United States users by heightening threats of Cybercrime. More so, having superior devices in non-upgraded networks means that attackers will use this vulnerability to execute attack events. This house can consider 5G censoring the IP, addressing schemes and other open protocols that would help the government take control of 5G. Currently, 5G networks installed across the United States by Verizon and AT&T lacks government footprints, while on the other hand, China has taken a centralized approach (Schulze, 2019). This proves the Trump administration lacks a reliable legal framework.
Front Camera
For long, this house has traditionally ignored the essence of controlling the front camera. The Privacy Act (1974) remains outdated and fails to cover key aspects, especially the front camera. However, the Act established a Code of Fair Information Practice that governs the use, dissemination, maintenance and collection of personally identifiable information. The Privacy Act requires the agency to provide public notice concerning the publication of Federal Register. Nonetheless, the act has not been properly hybridized with modern technologies, to enable the regulation of the Front Camera. The government should evaluate whether foreign countries and rogue companies can illegally collect random visual images of individuals or even personal conversation as embedded through the device hardware. The proposed Digital Privacy Act 2020, an Amendment of 2021, should reinforce a code of fair information practices, governing the collection of information, while requiring mobile research companies to control the bios system that enhances Front Camera surveillance.
Operating System
For long, the government has fully relied on common operating systems such as iOS, Windows, or Linux kernel. However, these operating systems have been downloaded, hacked, and reverse-engineered by foreign mercenaries sponsored by a foreign government using foreign technology. Today, a critical Cyber tool made in Russia, TOR has been used to conduct the Dark Web inside U.S. surveillance systems. Meanwhile, according to Cimpanu (2019), China will be developing its Operating System for its own government business. This is a far the largest threat the United States and its people will be facing. However, the government needs to adapt the Security by Obscurity making customized operating systems that enhance military level operations. The Government Obscurity Act 2022 will guide the Federal Government to make a computer with different infrastructure that can survey on another operating system but remains hidden against attackers.
Adhering to Cybersecurity Executive Order
Currently, the United States efforts to enhance surveillance have always accountability and bureaucratic challenges with the different arms of government outdoing each other. Cybersecurity presents a top priority while upgrading government machinery to promote flexibility with the private sector. Government agencies often enjoy higher flexibility when negotiating with the private sector. The military and intelligence communities serve as a motivational factor, presenting rapid changes in training and education. The government can create another Unit to facilitate Cyber-security but based on the previous consideration of an operating system, the government can operate a massive infrastructure on the web allowing incorporation of better security policies.
Conclusion
Ideally, the government has improved cybersecurity policing, regulation, and laws. However, it has transferred the entire burden of infrastructure development to the private sector. Nonetheless, the government needs to consider empowering its internal operations permitting them to adopt a competitive approach that would improve coordination and technological solutions while enhancing digital infrastructure. Much importantly, the federal security administration should create a special department for cybersecurity guidelines one based on identifying assets, networks, devices, data, and application while improving privacy requirements, standardization solutions, and improving federal security ethical surveillance approach.
References
Cimpanu, C. (2019). Chinese military to replace Windows OS amid fears of US hacking | ZDNet. Retrieved 2 August 2019, from https://www.zdnet.com/article/chinese-military-to-replace-windows-os-amid-fears-of-us-hacking/
Jing, M. (2019). China to fast-track 5G commercial licences amid Huawei’s woes. Retrieved 2 August 2019, from https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/2184044/china-says-it-will-fast-track-5g-commercial-licences-amid-push-back
Pagliery, J. (2019). Russia attacks U.S. oil and gas companies in the massive hack. Retrieved 2 August 2019, from https://money.cnn.com/2014/07/02/technology/security/russian-hackers/index.html
Schulze, E. (2019). The US is attacking Huawei and China — without its 5G strategy. Retrieved 2 August 2019, from https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/22/us-attacks-huawei-and-china-without-a-5g-strategy.html
Other Resources
Cybercrime Awareness Summary: https://justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf
Computer Crime Comparison Table: http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx
Cybercrime Awareness Summary: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-1025.pdf
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